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Abstract 
 
A large and established body of literature on nation building in post-socialist spaces has initially put 
emphasis on state-centred construction of identity references and markers such as language, educa-
tion or institutions and governance. In contrast, a recent stream of scholarship has attempted to 
bring agency into identity debates to propose new tools and approaches that can be used in the study 
of identity construction. This article is a further exploration of the latter position. It looks at the way 
identities are constructed, and renegotiated, at the everyday level, by ordinary people, by illustrating 
the competition between Russian and Ukrainian languages in Odessa, a Ukrainian city on the Black 
sea, to look at the synergy generated by the competition between local and national narratives.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The ever growing body of literature 
on nationalism, and nation building, ex-
ploring a actors, and tools, contributing to 
identity construction and consolidation at 
the national level (Gellner, 1984; Gui-
bernau, 2006; Smith, 1991; Billig, 1995) 
has, since 1989, been integrated by stud-
ies from the the post-socialist region. Of-
ten embedded in a Brubaker’s framework, 
scholars of post-socialism have explored 
the relationship between language and 
identity (Arel, 1995; Kuzio, 1998), inter-
pretations of national and ethnic markers 
(Laitin, 1998; Ehala, 2009) in the negotia-
tion, and renegotiation, of a national iden-
tity. In contrast to the above statist ap-
proaches, an alternative stream of re-
search has suggested switching  focus on-
to cultural references identified, con-
structed or performed, by bottom actors. 
Bringing back agency into identity de-
bates, scholars have explored the role of 
middle actors such as teachers or local 
leaders (Kerikma e, 2001; Polese, 2013; 
Rodgers, 2007; Richardson, 2008; 
Troitin o, 2013, 2013b; Wigglesworth-
Baker, 2016) in the redefinition of identi-
ty markers. Bringing this idea further, a 
new generation of scholars have been 
looking at the way official narratives on 
identity, constructed through macro-
processes by a state, can be questioned 
and renegotiated by everyday ways of liv-
ing and practicing identity (Fabrykant, 
2018; Gaufman, 2018; Kerikma e, Nyman-
Metcalf & Papageorgiou, 2013; Pawłusz & 
Seliverstova, 2016; Seliverstova, 2017).  
Two disting approaches have 
emerged from the above tendency. One 
explores non-traditional tools used to 
construct a national identity. In this re-
spect, studies have engaged with ways 
elections, cultural policies or mega pro-
jects may be a powerful, albeit sometimes 
unnoticed, way to redefine national iden-
tity or propose alternative identity mark-
ers (Danero Iglesias, 2017; Leonardis, 
2016, Isaacs, 2016; Isaacs & Polese, 2016; 
Menga, 2015; 2016; O  Beachain, 2016; O  
Beachain & Kevlihan, 2013; Ventsel, 
2016). The other focusses on the way 
identity is constructed, and negotiated, 
through practice at the everyday level by 
ordinary citizens (Polese et al, 2017; 
Polese et al, 2018). Authors engaging with 
this framework have analysed the role of 
music, consumption and other practices 
not traditionally linked to identity con-
struction (Bulakh, 2017; Datunashvili, 
2017; Pawlusz, 2017; Pechurina, 2017; 
Astapova, 2017) to suggest that markers 
proposed by ordinary citizens, aware or 
not of their role, may play a significant 
role beyond state-inducted narratives.  
This article brings further evidence 
to the above-mentioned paradigms by 
looking at the way identities are con-
structed, and renegotiated, at the every-
day level, by ordinary people. It uses the 
case study of Odessa, a Ukrainian city on 
the Black sea, to look at the synergy gen-
erated by the competition between local 
and national narratives. The significance 
of the case is due to the fact that the city 
has initially adopted, since its creation 
Russian as one of the main languages for 
both written and oral communication. 
Language use in public places has re-
mained unchallenged until 1991, when 
Ukraine became an independent and sov-
ereign state that eventually decided to 
adopt a single state language – Ukrainian - 
a thing that could pave the way to possi-
ble language or ethnically based conflicts. 
This risk had been already documented 
by debates on identity construction that, 
since the nineties, have been largely influ-
enced by the increasing of ethnic conflicts, 
initially explored through the 
“nationalising the state” framework pro-
vided by by Brubaker (1996). National, 
religious and economic concerns have 
been brought to politics and used politi-
cally to gain extra support from the popu-
lation. In some cases this renewed politi-
cal competition benefited the country, or 
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its society, as in the case of Poland, Czech-
oslovakia or Hungary. In other cases polit-
ical competition prompted leaders to 
dwell on ethnic politics, such as in former 
Yugoslavia, resulting in ethnic tensions 
sometimes escalating into violence. 
Sometimes political pluralism has 
facilitated a transition towards democra-
tisation –like most of the Central Europe-
an Countries and, to a certain extent, the 
Baltic countries and in Ukraine-, some 
other times transition has been smooth 
but is still incomplete and pluralism ex-
ists, though is not democratic –like in the 
case of Belarus or Russia. 
As a result, over the past years, de-
bates on management of multi-ethnic so-
cieties, and how to construct and main-
tain a national identity, have dramatically 
intensified. These studies have, however, 
largely downplayed the role of informal 
actors and practices in redefining national 
identity. As shown in this article, for one 
thing, the decision to make Ukrainian the 
sole state language, thus putting the ma-
jority of the Odessa population in the con-
dition to speak a minority language, has 
not led very far in practice. Even more in-
terestingly, possible conflicts - fomented 
by language or ethnic differences, have 
been put on hold for several years. In fact, 
this decision contrasted with the every-
day practice of its inhabitants that kept on 
using Russian as main language of com-
munication (Polese, 2009, 2013; Polese & 
Wylegala, 2008; Richardson, 2008). The 
case study presented here is intended to 
suggest that informal renegotiation of 
policies may lead to a balance between 
national and local modes of governance, 
allowing each community to live, and 
frame, their identity the way best suits 
them. 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Empirically this article has been in-
formed by data collected during a year of 
fieldwork in the city of Odessa during 
2003-2004 and 2005-2006. Much has 
changed since then, with insurgency 
spreading across Ukrainian eastern re-
gions and ethnic tensions between Rus-
sians and Ukrainians increasing in the 
city. Nonetheless, I consider the material 
still useful for at least two reasons.  
First, I see the tensions between 
what have been defined “Russians” and 
“Ukrainians” not ethnic or linguistic but 
mostly political. True that Kremlin fans in 
Odessa, as in the rest of the country, are 
more likely to be Russian speakers, whilst 
Kiev supporters are Ukrainian speakers. 
But there is also a large amount of Rus-
sian speakers who support Ukraine politi-
cally and ideologically.  
Second, and possibly more relevant 
to this article’s goals, empirical evidence 
on competition between Russian and 
Ukrainian is not intended to explain the 
political evolutions of the country but a 
social phenomenon that is still visible. 
The use of language, as observed during 
fieldwork, is not necessarily backed up by 
a political credo but by a practical neces-
sity to use the language one feels more 
comfortable with. It is used here to illus-
trate the case of a state demanding, from 
its citizens, something that they do not 
intend to provide and to show the role of 
individual agency in the renegotiation of 
state-led instructions.  
The core empirical evidence for this 
article are 49 in-depth interviews. In-
formants, identified through  snowball 
sampling, were met several times, to build 
trust relations, before being asked if they 
agreed to be interviewed (their identity 
was protected by anonimizing the data 
and changing their names).  
The information gathered was then 
triangulated with the results of intensive 
observation carried out in 6 schools and 
in 2 cultural centers. The schools were 
selected to enable a comparison between 
the best schools (elite institutes that were 
more likely to comply with state instruc-
tions with regards to language use, and 
thus have effects on the identity of the pu-
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pils) with some basic schools, in which 
the state had no particular interest and 
that were left free to decide on the level of 
Ukrainization they wanted to reach. A full 
elaboration of the intensive observation 
in schools has became the core material 
for a separate article. However data were 
also used here to  better interpret the ma-
terial collected through interviews. The 
next session provides an overview of na-
tion-building measures in Ukraine after 
1991. The following ones present the em-
pirical material collected at local schools 
and during the in-depth interviews, when 
the issues of plausibility and acceptance 
emerged.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Nation Building in Ukraine 
The successor states emerging from 
the collapse of three major federative 
states in Europe, the USSR, Czechoslo-
vakia and Yugoslavia provided scholars 
with a large amount of material to resume 
the debates on nation building, started 
during the 1960s and somehow on hold at 
that time. Thanks to a new generation of 
scholars working on Ukraine, the number 
of studies on the country quickly in-
creased. Kuzio (1998, 2001, 2002), in par-
ticular, claimed the possibility to classify 
Ukrainian nation building as civic, as op-
posed to ethnic-based nationalizing state 
framework conceived by Brubaker 
(1996), also focusing on Eastern Europe, a 
few years before. He was quickly followed 
by a number of other scholars 
(Barrington, 1995; Janmaat, 2000; Latin, 
1998; Schulman, 1999, 2002, 2003; 
Wolczuk, 2000) making thus Ukraine pos-
sibly the most post-Soviet country studied 
with regards to identity and nation-
building. 
What made Ukraine a particular 
case was the divergence between lan-
guage and identity. Officially about ninety 
percent of the local population voted for 
independence, a plebiscite echoing the 
attitude towards the USSR present in oth-
er countries (i.e. the Baltics). However, 
only a fraction of those voting for inde-
pendence had Ukrainian as their main 
language. This was the result not only of 
Sovietization policies but also, and possi-
bly more important, of a preference ac-
corded to Russian well before the October 
Revolution (Kravchenko, 1985). Ukraini-
an language became, however, one of the 
main points on the country’s first presi-
dent political agenda. Leonid Kravchuk 
introduced not only a number of laws in 
boosting the importance of Ukrainian. He 
even suggested a motion thanks to which 
Ukrainian presidents should display a suf-
ficient command of the national language 
to be elected. Strategically adequate for a 
nation-building project, Kravchuk’s ra-
tionale was contrasted by the reality of a 
country where Russian was widely spo-
ken with peaks in the southern and east-
ern regions (Khmelko, 2004). The number 
of Ukrainian speakers, however, started 
raising. As a success of the nation building 
project, according to state narratives, as a 
consequence of some sort of “cheating the 
statistics” according to some scholars. In-
deed, the 2001 census was widely criticiz-
ing for its methodology, failure to inter-
view citizens in person and ethnic identi-
ty assigned on the base of the interview-
er’s impression, rather than the respond-
ent’s answer (Stebelsky, 2009). Still, as 
Shevel pointed out, endorsement of the 
Ukrainian state was done, by a growing 
number of citizens, through a claim to be 
native speakers of Ukrainian during the 
census interview, regardless of what lan-
guage they would speak in reality.  
Further laws highlighted the im-
portance of Ukrainian, making it the sole 
language for official state documents and 
the main medium for instruction in 
schools in 1998. Ukrainian language 
teaching was the standard by default with 
exceptions allowed only in parts of the 
country where the number of ethnic Rus-
sians was overwhelmingly higher. Prac-
Available Online at http://journal.unismuh.ac.id/index.php/otoritas 
Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, 8 (1),  April, 2018, 5 
Copyright © 2018, Otoritas : Jurnal Ilmu Pemerintahan, ISSN: 2088-3706 (Print), ISSN: 2502-9320 (Online)  
tice was slow to follow theory (Arel, 
1995). Nonetheless the number of pre-
schools in Ukrainian rose from 51 percent 
in 1991 to 76 percent in 2000. Primary 
and secondary schools followed a similar 
pattern, increasing from 49 percent in 
1991 to 70 percent in 2000. Southern and 
eastern regions were slower in catching 
up (UCEPS, 2002) but, by 2002, the num-
ber of pupils studying in Russian had de-
creased to 25 percent. Changes were reg-
istered not only in the medium of instruc-
tion but also in the very content of the 
subjects to be taught, a thing that in-
trigued a few scholars over the years 
(Janmaat, 2005; Kuzio, 2001; Popson, 
2001; Wolczuk, 2000). Ideologically, com-
mitment to Ukrainian was shown by start-
ing calling it “native language” (ridna 
mova) for all the students (Polese, 2010), 
regardless of which was their language in 
practice. Along schools, media broadcast-
ing witnessed a real “language revolution” 
with Ukrainian becoming the main lan-
guage for regional and national broad-
casting in 2005.  
Ukrainization of the Educational Sector 
Collection of empirical data was in-
tended to test the efficacity of the above 
measures. As a result, a first part of the 
fieldwork was conducted in schools, 
where intensive observation over several 
days was carried out. Once a teacher en-
ters the classroom students will stand up 
in silence. In case, the teacher will address 
in Russian the noisy students to ask them 
to stop. Further to this, any technical in-
formation will be delivered in Russian un-
til “the class begins” officially. The teacher 
will then try to speak, as much as possi-
ble, in Ukrainian, even translating what a 
student had just said in Russian into 
Ukrainian. They might also want to trans-
late back into Russian something they just 
said  in Ukrainian if they gather the im-
pressions that students are not under-
standing sufficiently. Teachers are not 
necessarily Ukrainian native speakers. 
Some words will come to their mind in 
Russian first but their task will be to give 
the impression that the overall class is 
conducted in Ukrainian, even when Rus-
sian words are used. When reacting to a 
question, students have two main options. 
They will speak Ukrainian if they can re-
call the answer from their textbook. They 
will otherwise use Russian if their answer 
results from their intuition or reasoning 
that is not necessarily taken from the 
book. The teacher might just accept an 
answer in Russian or translate it into 
Ukrainian with the goals of reminding the 
official language but also to expand the 
students’ vocabulary. Both goals serve the 
function of educating children to be sensi-
tive to the context and understand that 
they need to use the state language in offi-
cial occasions.  
Sometimes students, like all chil-
dren, will be distracted by something, 
joke or simply talk to their neighbours. 
The teacher will then call for order in 
Russian in the majority of cases. They first 
use Ukrainian but, once this fails to per-
suade the students, they switch to Rus-
sian. Students might try to ignore the 
teacher in their official role but will find 
more difficult to do the same once the 
teacher proposes themselves as “one of 
us” thus speaking the same language and 
reminding the personal relationship that 
they have established with the children in 
the course of the year(s). When the class 
is over, and interaction becomes informal 
again, Russian will be preferred to 
Ukrainian to deliver the final instructions 
before ending the class. Homework is an 
exception and will be given in Ukrainian, 
reminding the student that this is the lan-
guage they are supposed to study in.  
There are several Ukrainian speak-
ing villages around Odessa, some of them 
providing teachers to the city’s schools. 
However, urban residents are more likely 
to have Russian as a first language and, 
once completed their studies, they are re-
quested to teach in Ukrainian. In the 
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course of my observations, only once I en-
countered a Ukrainian speaker teaching 
in Ukrainian but in many other cases I 
have witnessed the efforts of Russian 
speakers to comply with national regula-
tions in terms of means of instruction. 
This is not only a desire to respect the 
rule but also a responsibility. Teachers 
know that their students will enter a job 
market where knowledge of Ukrainian is 
crucial and, by encouraging use of the na-
tional language they feel they increase the 
chances of their pupils to get a better job 
in the long run. A teacher once reported 
to me ‘students are not native Ukrainian 
speakers; neither am I but we do our 
best.’ (Polese, 2010) 
In addition to this dual use, official 
narratives in public places tend to mini-
mize the use of Russian in everyday con-
texts. Talking with an administrative of a 
major school, I hinted that the  fact that 
“History of Odessa” was taught in Ukraini-
an could sound a paradox since most of 
the written sources and textbooks about 
the history of the city are in Russian. Ini-
tially she endorsed my statament, adding 
that in that school (Ukrainian already for 
10 years) Russian, the local language, was 
widely used. I tried to push her state-
ments futher but then she renegotiated, 
suggesting that, to the best of her 
knowledge, the teacher was using Ukrain-
ian in her classes. She advocated for a 
gradual and flexible approach given that, 
in her understanding, not all students 
(and teachers) had come to realize that 
Ukrainian was the official state language 
at the time.  
During observations in another 
school I came across a teacher admitting 
that its pupils often confused Russian and 
Ukrainian. He also recalled that, although 
classes were intended to be all in Ukraini-
an, the fact that pupils, and teachers, had 
a bad command of it pushed the use of 
Russian much father than the state would 
like to hear. After all, and this was also 
confirmed by other teachers a number of 
official books were available only in Rus-
sian with the exception of Ukrainian liter-
ature subjects, where Ukrainian speakers 
were often available.  
Not only language practice seems to 
be distinct from how things should work 
in theory. Even more important is the ex-
istence of an unwritten code of communi-
cation. None of my informants were offi-
cially opposing linguisting change and the 
use of Ukrainian. They mentioned clearly 
that Ukrainian should be known, used and 
protected, being the official state lan-
guage. In practice, Russian was given a 
permanent status of exception, meaning 
that use of Russian was advertised as inci-
dental, due to a given moment and a given 
context. However, when this “incidental” 
use of Russian leads to its regular use in 
most, not to say all, situations, the social 
scientist start getting aware of the gap 
between theory and practice. Schools, and 
their staff, regularly work to build the im-
pression that state instructions are abid-
ed and Ukrainian is largely used. A num-
ber of teachers know that they should be 
using Ukrainian and claim to do so, but 
switch to Russian as soon as this becomes 
possible or convenient, for instance, if 
both interlocutors of a conversation are 
Russian speakers, which happens quite 
often.  
Little pressure is put on students to 
increase the occasions in which they use 
Ukrainian From the teachers’ side, there 
seem to exist two channels of communica-
tion in the previous situation. Teachers 
are, in theory, civil servants. In this quali-
ty they represent the state and have to 
endorse official narratives and use 
Ukrainian or, at least, give the impression 
to be using Ukrainian when performing 
their duties. In the end education towards 
an attitude is as important as education 
towards knowledge. Pupils do not only 
learn notions but also how to behave in a 
society that expects them to speak 
Ukrainian during their official performing 
of duties. Being able to display knowledge 
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of Ukrainian was a plus on people, and 
pupils, capacity to compete on the job 
market in the long run. However, people 
were not going to change their life habits 
to comply one hundred percent with state 
requirements.  
The Ukrainian dimension is stressed 
at several occasions and in several 
schools that I visited with the exception of 
the Russian school chosen for observation 
where a clear borderline between the lan-
guages is drafted. While there are subjects 
(mostly literature and history of Ukraine) 
that are taught in Ukrainian, and the rest 
in Russian, pupils are nonetheless ex-
pected to have a good understanding and 
use of the language. Indeed, from the se-
cond year on, they are expected to be 
functional in Ukrainian. Interestingly 
enough, I managed to ask about the ethnic 
background of pupils and they all an-
swered to be Ukrainian, to know, read 
and watch Ukrainian TV but they studied 
in Russian. Their linguistic choice did not 
deny the role of Ukrainian language in the 
country and the city. Paradoxically, it 
seemed to help them to construct parallel 
spaces where Russian and Ukrainian 
could co-exist and where, although their 
preference would go to Russian, the role 
of Ukrainian was acknowledged.  
Observation in schools provided an 
opportunity to notice the possibility, at 
least in Odessa, to renegotiate informally 
state-led instructions on the language 
used in schools and official communica-
tion. Keeping in mind an official version of 
things where Ukrainian is the main lan-
guage to use, Russian is used in the class-
room, teachers’ meetings, speaking with 
children’s parents and in many other con-
texts. This can be lead to a situation 
where Ukrainian is barely used but peo-
ple keep a positive attitude towards the 
language (Polese, 2011, 2011b).  
The use of Ukrainian becomes thus 
functional to given an impression, to 
“construct a façade of Ukrainianess”. 
Teachers and other state representatives 
thus carry out a sort of “mediation” be-
tween policy makers and policy takers 
(citizens). Teachers have agency not only 
on the use of language but also on the per-
spective they provide, interpretation of 
history and attitude towards national 
symbols (Polese, 2014; Richardson,  
2008; Rodgers, 2007). Ukrainian and Rus-
sian, and their use, can then be regarded, 
rather than ethnic markers, a mean to dis-
tinguish official communication from un-
official one, public from private spaces. 
The impossibility to micro manage every 
single class, control every single teacher 
and their attitude provides extra space for 
a renegotiation of identity, and its bound-
aries. In the end the bottom line is not the 
use of Ukrainian for official communica-
tion and official time but the impression 
to be using Ukrainian. As long as people 
know that they should be doing Ukraini-
an, use of Russian may considered “an ex-
ception”. 
Ukrainization of private spaces 
Are Odessans Ukrainian? To what 
extent? Are Odessans as Ukrainian as any 
other Ukrainian in the country, no matter 
whether from eastern or western re-
gions? Are all Ukrainians Ukrainian the 
same way? Glancing through national sur-
veys one could answer that people from 
Donetsk, Odessa and Lviv are Ukrainian, 
but a doubt might arise on to what extent 
Ukrainians give the same meaning to the 
word 'Ukrainian'. Whereas stimulations 
from the centre are similar for the whole 
country, the response of the peripheries 
may depend on a number of factors that 
rely on historical, social and geographical 
features.  
Why somebody in Odessa should 
consider itself Ukrainian? I am not talking 
of those who have 'no escape' because 
born in Ukrainian families, Ukraine native 
speakers and attached to the Ukrainian 
soil. I refer to those 'in between' that are a 
consistent group in the city and in the 
country. Fournier (2002) call them 
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‘hybrid’, Wilson (2002) use the expres-
sion ‘grey zone’. What would be the moti-
vation for change for those who are born 
from mixed marriages, who are divided 
between two or more identities, or are 
undecided, on whether to adopt a Ukrain-
ian identity? 
Reshaping of subjective identity cri-
teria depends on two factors: plausibility 
and acceptance. In this respect the tipping 
model proposed by Laitin (1998) is ex-
tremely relevant but a model conceived 
for a number of cases does not necessarily 
fit a particular one. I use the term 
'plausibility' as Schlee (2004) does, to re-
fer to the capacity, and potentiality, to 
'sell oneself' as native to other natives. 
This leads us to the second factor, ac-
ceptance, at personal and group level. At 
personal level, I address reshaping and 
reconstruction of personal and subjective 
memory, acceptation of national symbol-
ism and the predisposition and willing-
ness to 'betray' one's origins to pick up a 
new identity. I will illustrate some exam-
ples in the next section. At group level, it 
is relevant to explore the openness of oth-
er people to accept renegotiated identities 
and the willingness not to question or 
doubt of somebody's conversion once it 
happened.  
Plausibility 
Mikhail (24) considers himself as 
Ukrainian while his younger brother (21) 
does not, or not in full at least. Born to the 
same parents (a Russian father and a 
Ukrainian mother living in Odessa), the 
older brother moved to Kiev with his wife 
and child to work. Moving to Kiev, and 
then learning using Ukrainian for his day-
to-day communication, was a milestone in 
Mikhail’s life, who start feeling more and 
more Ukrainian to the point that his fa-
ther felt betrayed, at some point. Eventu-
ally this became acceptable at the family 
level and even Mikhail’s brother, when 
asked more in detail, admitted that he is 
confused and does not feel hundred per-
cent Russian but also somehow Ukrainian.   
This is not the only case, several in-
formants seemed to have issued from 
“switching families”, changing their na-
tionality in the course of their life. Anoth-
er Moldova-born informant, with Russian 
father and Russian-Ukrainian mother 
(born in Russian but in a Ukrainian village 
in northern Caucasus) had diverged from 
his brother’s path becoming Ukrainian 
and living in Kiev, while his brother had 
remained in Russian and loyal to his Rus-
sian identity. He eventually got married in 
Kiev and his children feel Ukrainian.  
Further interviews confirmed this 
ambiguous border. A 20-year old inform-
ant declared herself Ukrainia but admit-
ted that, until she turned 16, she was con-
vinced to be Russian. Her elder brother 
(26) declared himself Ukrainian claiming 
that his parents chose for him at the  time 
of the national census. I had the chance to 
talk to their parents, who seemed con-
fused themselves by the break-up of the 
Soviet Union, when everything was easi-
er: they were all Soviet back then. Anoth-
er informant (26 at the time of the inter-
view) claimed to be Polish on the basis of 
some of his ancestors, in spite of having a 
declared Russian father and Ukrainian 
mother. When I inquired further, he ad-
mitted some kind of Ukrainian identity 
but, according to his father, whom I also 
interviewed, he is in fact Russian.  
Why some transformations are 
smoother, or easier, than others? Is there 
a rule behind those patterns of behav-
iour? One point I make here is that people 
try to produce evidence to motivate their 
choice in a very singular way. The choice 
does not come from an inner analysis of 
all the elements in my body, followed by a 
rationale assessment on who I am but in-
dividuals make an emotional choice and 
then search for ground to motivate it.  
Plausibility is quite important in the 
definition of an identity and it comes in 
two components, plausibility for the self 
and the others. If I my parents are from 
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Russia and I was born there I might have 
some difficulties in convincing myself that 
I am Ukrainian. I could make up for this if 
I grew up there, have a Ukrainian pass-
port or lived in the country long enough. 
But still, how easy it would be to 'forget' 
my origins? Or convince others that I am 
Ukrainian? In my case each of the above 
mentioned persons had enough evidence 
to declare at least three national identities 
and they choose the evidence they find 
most useful. In addition the answer to 
these questions also depends on the place 
I live in as in Odessa to be accepted as 
Ukrainian seems easier than in Lviv for 
instance (Polese & Wylegala, 2008).  
In many cases hearing that identity 
was connected to gratitude to their moth-
erland, where informants had found their 
own dimension, pointed at the fact that 
emotional connections count, and quite a 
lot, in the choice of an identity. After all, in 
a place as mixed as Odessa, it is often pos-
sible to find out about an ancestor of a 
given (declared) ethnicity that will inform 
your own choice. In each individual there 
is much evidence and they may pick up 
the one they need to support their choice. 
Nation building, in this respect, is a bet: 
the bet to push people to pick up the 
'right' evidence to feel part of the national 
community.  
State attitude, however, counts. I 
might not feel more Ukrainian if I have a 
Ukrainian passport but I am more likely 
to feel Russian if I am refused a Ukrainian 
passport for some reason. In this respect, 
I consider helpful to the consolidation of 
national identity the openness of Ukraine 
to offer anyone living in the country in 
1991 the chance to apply for citizenship, 
and then passport, regardless of their eth-
nic background.  
The 'passport competition', still on-
going in Ukraine, is certainly not a model 
of civic nation building. Holding of a 
Ukrainian passport excludes any other 
citizenship so that people have to live 
Ukrainian one as exclusive and give up 
everything to get it, including the possibil-
ity to visit their home country (think of 
Bulgarian or Polish minorities who need a 
visa to go 'home'). Nonetheless the rule 
has been applied elastically and, despite 
having heard many times that people can-
not get a second passport, I know a con-
sistent number of people who have it, just 
keep it hidden. So far, thus, there is no 
reason to reject the Ukrainian state, as no 
choice is involved.  
As Ukrainian citizens grow up, they 
will have two environments to face, the 
household and the outside one. At home 
the parents will have a consistent influ-
ence on him but this is not enough to de-
fine an identity, otherwise all my inform-
ants with proud Russian father or families 
would call themselves Russian. There is 
socialization outside the parents' sight, 
there is social life outside the family and 
cultural references or spreading of a na-
tional idea are also important. 
It is certainly important that Ukraini-
an history be pro-Ukraine, but it is like-
wise important the very fact that there be 
a Ukrainian history subject in schools. 
Children can learn that Ukraine is a friend 
or enemy of Russia, but they will learn 
that they live under the Ukrainian roof, 
and this is not a thing to be neglected. 
From Weber on, it is acknowledged that 
definition of self is connected to the defi-
nition of the other and the very fact that a 
Ukrainian version exists is enough not to 
question which version of history we 
need as we have ‘ours’. Language for the 
individual is also important but, rather 
than the frequency with which the nation-
al language is used, one shall look at the 
fact that it is there and people see it as a 
tool they can use. A Russian speaking 
friend once told me, after mentioning she 
was going to travel to Russia with other 
Ukrainians “great! we can talk to each 
other in the train and people will not un-
derstand us!” In spite of the fact that she 
does not uses it for daily communication, 
she -and many informants I have talked 
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with- sees it as an asset, something 'we 
have and they do not have'. Is it really so 
important to current generations that 
Ukraine was conquered by Russia or en-
tered an alliance in 1754? Or is it relevant 
that national and world history has a 
Ukrainian starting point, who is “right” or 
“wrong” in history?  
“I do not see a major difference be-
tween Russia and Ukraine. Yes, Moscow is 
different but rural areas are quite the 
same in both countries. Indeed, my first 
time to Russia I left the train and noticed 
a Russian flag at the station. Apart from 
that, and judging by the panorama, I could 
as well be in Ukraine stil. (Sasha, 26. 
Ukrainian with Russian father)‘.  
Another informant reported:  “I am 
Ukrainian. I speak Russian but I am 
Ukrainian and I first understood this 
when I went to Russia. I was in St. Peters-
burg, I could understand the language, the 
local culture but I did not feel at home 
(Eva 22, during a debate on identity)”. Go-
ing abroad seemed a main milestone in 
the life of several informants, who had to 
face misconceptions and confusion be-
tween the two cultures, prompting them 
to take a side. A number of informants 
had indeed changed their attitude to-
wards Ukrainian culture, language or 
even Russian language after a period 
abroad, especially if they were gathering 
with other people from the former USSR. 
Full challenging of the system of value or 
state role on citizens' life, like irredentism 
or separatism, does not really apply to 
Ukraine but people might oppose 
Ukraineness at a personal level. On what 
this will depend? Wanner (1998) talks of 
economic identities, in contrast with ad-
vocacy of national identity based on eth-
nic affiliation. Like often, the truth might 
lie in between, and literature on conflict 
can help us to understand. It is true that 
ethnic sentiments count in peoples' 
choice and economic elements are also 
relevant, But it is the combination of the 
two factors that directions people and re-
inforces their choice. What happens if you 
do not go abroad? You do not become 
Ukrainian? Going abroad was the moment 
when people had to mature a choice but 
they might never have to face this choice 
and never ask themselves who they are. 
For instance, some informants admitted 
they never ask themselves the question. 
During my interviews I asked how the na-
tional conversion of the informer had 
happened. I was often indicated a very 
precise moment in the life of the interloc-
utor. This ranged from just traveling 
throughout Ukraine to entering the uni-
versity and to travel to Russia to chal-
lenge anti-Ukrainian elders; but I would 
suggest that this was just the moment in 
which the person saw a process that was 
already over, when it took consciousness 
of the self. There were also a number of 
people who had not lived this process and 
refused to acknowledge Ukraine as their 
motherland. They could either refuse 
Ukraine or just ignore it. 
If the question is why they should 
feel themselves Ukrainian an an answer 
may be 'why not?' Once they are born in 
Ukraine, their childhood memories are 
linked to the Ukrainian soil, the state has 
accepted them, provided them with edu-
cation and, theoretically, is taking care of 
them, why they should refuse to 
acknowledge its role? One could imagine 
they are sitting on the fence and can 
choose where to jump, they can jump 
forth and follow the state and their moth-
erland or back and shelter themselves in-
to their origins. They can do this if they 
are unsatisfied with the state and this is a 
way to dissociate from it. The places that 
cannot be reached by the state or those 
that the state fails to protect are more 
likely to produce anti-Ukrainian feelings. 
The only two exceptions may be: they are 
unsatisfied with their situation at eco-
nomic or emotional level. The (few) in-
formants who refused the Ukrainian state 
projected on their motherland (mainly 
Russia) all the frustrations they had about 
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their current situation, dreaming that 
'there (in Russia) this would not happen.'  
Acceptance 
What is the engine of identity 
change? I would rely on intangible factors, 
like Connor (2004) but I would also sug-
gest that, as long as an individual declares 
timidly itself Ukrainian, and other people 
start believing it, conversion may happen 
faster. In this lies the importance of 'not 
to question' who the other is. As long as a 
simple declaration prompts group ac-
ceptance, people will be more likely to see 
each other as Ukrainians.  
‘When I was in Lviv, a lady asked me 
about my wife's nationality. Used to the 
fact that in Odessa anybody can be Odes-
san or Ukrainian if their want, I said 'she 
is ours [nasha], she is Ukrainian: her fa-
ther is Russian and her mother is half 
Azeri half Ukrainian. I was shocked by her 
attitude, she said that such person is defi-
nitely not a Ukrainian, only 'pure' Ukraini-
ans are Ukrainian.’ 
As long as such attitude is present, 
conversion will be extremely difficult. 
Though this seemed a limited pheonome-
non (Polese & Wylegala, 2008). The fact 
that Odessans are more relaxed on ethnic 
origins of their fellow citizens should not 
be generalized. I cannot maintain here 
that everybody can be accepted as Odes-
san or Ukrainian as long as it fulfills some 
criteria but people can be clustered into 
two categories: ‘native’ and ‘non-native’. 
That is to say, acceptance of a Ukrainian 
identity has some limits and, for the time 
being, physical traits are a serious con-
straint. There are ethnic groups that are 
deemed 'native' for the city and others 
not. A Ukrainian identity is plausible as 
long as it is declared by somebody who 
has physical traits of the native groups, 
and is a Russian native speaker, but what 
would happen if anybody with a non Eu-
ropean appearance declared itself Ukrain-
ian? One of my informants married a 
Ukrainian citizen who was an ethnic Ko-
rean (and thus easily identifiable on the 
street). He told me: 
“When we are in the street police-
men tend to stop her and ask for her pass-
port (Odessa is not Moscow and in 2 years 
I have never been stopped, despite being 
more dark-eyed and dark-haired than the 
average Slavic person), they tend not to 
believe that she is Ukrainian and control 
her quite long. When they go too far she 
timidly mentions she works for the tax 
inspection governmental service and she 
is immediately released. But this is not all. 
When she was in primary school she was 
informed that the school had 'lost' her 
birth certificate and she had to leave the 
school for that reason. The next day her 
mother (one of the most important per-
sons in Odessa) made the right phone call 
and they immediately retrieved the certif-
icate.” 
As a general tendency, elder genera-
tions were less likely to sympathize with 
the language in case they were not used 
to use it. Younger generations were much 
more positive, most of my students knew 
it and, if not, they at least declare they re-
spected it. A similar pattern was found in 
younger generations when I was in 
schools and, at least officially, everybody 
seems to know Ukrainian, although they 
might get along with Russian much better. 
In the course of the interviews, nobody 
denied the Ukrainianess of Donetsk and 
Lviv but there was linguistic competition 
upon Ukrainian. This is not specific to 
Odessa and I have remarked it in other 
cities, where they tend to deny Ukrainian 
language skills of other cities. One will of-
ten hear that people from western 
Ukraine speak not really Ukrainian but a 
mix of Polish and Ukrainian whereas peo-
ple in the east speak rather closer to Rus-
sian and people from Kiev mix everything. 
When asked about Odessa people dismiss 
the question with a smile. I once gained 
sympathy of a Ukrainian nationalist only 
thanks to my Odessa stay as he accepted 
my long stay in Odessa as the only 
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‘plausible’ reason why I preferred to 
speak Russian rather than Ukrainian. Of-
ten, however, those differences are more 
imagined than real. When I was in Rivne a 
student told me that in the east they can-
not speak proper Ukrainian. He told this 
in surzhyk. Likewise, a foreign journalist 
reported to have been surprised that in 
Donetsk they can speak Ukrainian. He had 
lived long in Moscow and went from Kiev 
to the Donetsk region to meet some min-
ers. When asking about linguistic prefer-
ences he reported they immediately 
switched into Ukrainian, though I cannot 
be sure what ‘kind of Ukrainian’ they 
were using since to him everything would 
sound ‘exotic’. They too claimed they hold 
the real language since, in the west, the 
language is too much Polish-polluted.  
Ukrainian language may be regarded 
as a symbol and showing a positive atti-
tude is more important than being able to 
speak it in the end (Polese & Wylegala, 
2008b). One could also suggest that Odes-
sans speak Ukrainian but one Odessan 
speaks Russian. Locals have a clear under-
standing of the distinction between state 
language for public use and use for pri-
vate use. They just happen to expand, reg-
ularly, the sphere of the private to unoffi-
cial communication on the workplace, 
where Russian is used, apparently, 
“occasionally” or “incidentally” several 
times during the day, sometimes even 
constantly. However, the impression is 
often that Russian is used in a given mo-
ment as an exception (a Russian speaker 
entered the conversation, a Soviet movie 
is cited). Eventually, Russian speakers can 
use their language as long as they given 
the impression to be able to switch back 
to Ukrainian at any time. The quintes-
sence of this attitude is the attitude of civ-
il servants working in the city council, 
where most of the written and oral com-
munication is in Russian. Ukrainian is 
used only when a document goes out to 
the central administration or other public 
offices. In these cases, workers will work 
to respect linguistic hierarchies and stick 
to the official communication protocol, 
look for one of the few Ukrainian speak-
ers working in the office and get the docu-
ment translated.  
CONCLUSION 
In addition to state-centred mecha-
nisms for identity construction, a number 
of informal mechanisms for negotiation of 
national identity are in place, in Odessa as 
elsewhere. On the one hand, we have the 
way the elites, the state, and its institu-
tions conceive national identity. They 
“imagine” the nation, in a more civic or 
ethnic manner,  construct a national nar-
rative intended to fit, and be applied in, all 
possible cases and geographical ares of 
the country. However, this narrative may 
sometimes contrast with some realities, 
situations, geographical areas, where the 
national narrative may be in conflict with 
the way locals perceive, and live, their 
own identity.  
Renegotiation of identity at the top 
level would, most likely, entail a political 
confrontation between state and non-
state actors, between institutions and in-
dividuals – or better, organizations of in-
dividuals. However, there are ways this 
can be avoided and this article has shown 
one of them. If a state proposes a policy, 
without forcing or controlling to what ex-
tent citizens comply, and citizens create 
the impression to comply with the official 
discourse, without necessarily adopting it 
always and everywhere, then everyone 
seems satisfied. The state, and its institu-
tions, do not feel challenged in their sym-
bolic power by citizens, who officially 
abide to formal instructions and accept 
national narratives.  
In practice, however, these narra-
tives are renegotiated at the everyday lev-
el, when “an exception” is created and 
Russian is used instead of Ukrainian, 
“only here only now”, creating a perma-
nent state of exception, a sort of linguistic 
porto franco. The “Ukrainisation” of Odes-
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sa is based on a tacit compromise be-
tween the authorities and the citizens, be-
tween officers involved in local and na-
tional management of governance issues. 
The national parliament conceives a poli-
cy (or set thereof) that are then explained 
in general terms to technical managers at 
the regional and local level. Such policies 
get renegotiated first by the technocrats 
who need to translate them into instruc-
tions and passed to local authorities. Lo-
cal authorities, in turn, will interpret and 
think of the best way to deliver these in-
structions to common citizens who, in 
turn, will only partially comply with the 
instructions, that  are thus delivered but 
no control is applied, or no punishment is 
foreseen for the non-compliants, making 
possible informal renegotiation of policies 
at the local level. Further studies are 
needed before being able to lay out a the-
ory of informal governance. However, I 
would suggest, this combination of elastic 
rules and limited control is allowing local 
leaders and actors to feel relatively free 
and making easier to accept a Ukrainian 
identity based on relatively flexible 
boundaries and markers. 
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